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TESTING PORTER'S HYPOTHESIS: A STOCHASTIC
FRONTIER PANEL DATA ANALYSIS OF DUTCH
HORTICULTURE
Abstract:
We propose a test of the Porter hypothesis for the Dutch horticulture sector, using a stochastic
production frontier analysis allowing for an inclusion of policy variables to account for the
effect of environmental policy of firm performance. We find considerable heterogeneity in the
way firms react to environmental policy measures. Our estimation results indicate, for
example, that a 1997 voluntary agreement covering energy, nutrient and pesticides use
enhances technical efficiency of vegetable and plants growers, contrary to specialised flower
growers. Specialised flower growers, however, did react to the 1993 multi-year agreement on
energy reduction, contrary to vegetable and plant growers. Summarising, our findings are
mixed but do not seem to reject the anecdotal evidence mentioned by Porter and Van der
Linde (1995b) that Dutch horticulture firms’ performance increased due to increased
environmental stringency.
JEL codes: D24, Q12, Q50
Keywords: firm performance, environmental stringency, technical efficiency
21. Introduction
Environmental economists schooled in the neoclassical tradition are tempted to assume that
environmental policy endangers the competitiveness of (domestic) firms compared to
(foreign) competitors that are not subject to such policy. The main reason for this is that
environmental policy shifts formerly external costs back on to the firm burdening it relative to
competing firms exposed to less strict environmental regulations. Porter (1991) launched a
completely opposing view in what is nowadays called the Porter hypothesis: “Strict
environmental regulations do not inevitably hinder competitive advantage against foreign
rivals, they often enhance it” (Porter 1991, p. 162)
As pointed out by Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné (1995, 2001) the precise meaning of
the Porter hypothesis is unclear in as far as the positive impact on private costs is concernedi.
In an attempt to elucidate the Porter hypothesis they distinguish the following variants:
-Enhanced competitiveness due to environmental policy-induced demand for complementary
products and services. Environmental policy frequently requires the development of new
products that reduce emissions or products that use less inputs. In this context Porter gives
examples such as exports of relatively benign pesticides from the restrictive US to countries
that do not have such regulations in place. Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné observe that the
present kind of situations are not really win-win because in the importing country private
costs increase;
-Relatively enhanced competitiveness of the regulated firm due to the first-mover advantage.
In this case strict environmental regulations will raise the costs of domestic firms subject to
them but but due to learning effects less so than for firms in countries that implement similar
regulations at a later stage. Again, according to Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné (1995) this is
not a win-win situation because the costs on the private sector rise even though some firms
and possibly countries benefit at others´ expenseii.
-Absolute cost reduction for the regulated firm. Hence environmental policies are potential
win-win policies that simultaneously reduce the firm’s private costs as well as the external
costs in the form of environmental degradation.
It is the last variant that is truly win-win. For this variant to hold Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné
(2001) mention the following sufficient conditions:
(i) The firm is operating inside its cost-efficiency frontier ex ante, which implies that
there is an organisational failure in the firm in the form of e.g., perverse
incentives, hidden actions, imperfect information, strategic behaviour and moral
hazard.
(ii) Environmental regulations stimulate a sufficiently large improvement in
productive efficiency to outweigh the internalised costs.
(iii) Conditions (i) and (ii) are systematically rather than incidentally true. For this
requirement to be met more empirical evidence is required than the anecdotal
evidence provided by Porter
According to Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné the underlying mechanism of the Porter
hypothesis is that new environmental policy provokes a radical restructuring and
reorganisation in the firm. Initially the firm’s organisational structure is such that the firm is
cost minimising. With the passage of time, relative prices, regulatory conditions and the
firm’s competitive situation change. Cost-minimisation requires the firm to adapt to the
changing circumstances. If the organisational structure could be changed frequently, in small
steps and at negligible cost, the firm would do so. However, these conditions are rarely, if
ever, met in practice. Therefore, adaptation will only take place occasionally, and if total
benefits of adaptation outweigh total adaptation costs. Another obstacle to adaptation is
organisational failure that prevents the firm from reacting to opportunities or threats, contrary
to an unconstrained firm. New environmental regulations that are stringent enough would
impact on the adaptation costs and benefits or create strong incentives to deal with
organisational failure. In both cases the firm has an incentive to reoptimise its internal
structure. Porter and van der Linde (1995a) argue that lax regulations allow firms to adapt
incrementally whereas strict policies promote substantial innovations which in its turn
stimulates competitiveness:
3“By stimulating innovation strict environmental regulations can actually enhance
competitiveness” (Porter and Van der Linde 1995, p.98).
Porter and Van der Linde (1995a) give 6 reasons why regulation might promote
innovation. These include that regulation makes firms aware of technical inefficiencies and
reduces uncertainty about profitability of environmental investments. Moreover, with
stringent regulation more benefits in terms of innovation offsets can be expected than with lax
regulation.
In spite of the fact that Porter amply quotes anecdotal evidence (including evidence
from Dutch horticulture) the hypothesis is still very much debated. One of the reasons for this
is that not much systematic empirical work has been done in this area. The empirical research
that has been done can be categorised as follows. Firstly, there is a literature studying the
relationship between strictness of environmental regulation and competitiveness as measured
by export performance at the national or the industry level. An often-used indicator of
strictness of environmental regulation is PACE (Pollution Abatement Capital Expenditures).
If a negative impact of PACE on export performance is found, then this could be interpreted
as direct support for notably the second variant of the Porter hypothesis (see e.g., Mulatu
2004 for an assessment of this approach). Secondly, differences in environmentally related
patents between regulated and unregulated firms can be analysed. Empirical evidence that
regulated firms outperform unregulated ones provides support for notably the first and second
variant. This line of research was initiated by Lanjouw and Mody (1996) and was pursued
further by Jaffe and Palmer (1997), Taylor et al. (2003) and De Vries and Withagen (2004).
In the present paper we develop a third approach, with a focus on the third variant.
Earlier contributions in this strand of literature use productivity indices to measure the effect
of environmental regulation on efficiency (see Nakanoi, 2003). We use a stochastic frontier
framework, that will be applied to Dutch horticulture. This is a very interesting sector in
relation to the Porter hypothesis. In Porter and Van der Linde (1995b) Dutch horticulture is
also used as an example where environmental policy has induced major innovation. And, in a
recent speech the Dutch Minister of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries argues as
follows. "According to Porter the floriculture sector is the only real cluster of international
importance in the Netherlands. The whole chain in our horticulture cluster is a close-knit and
innovative one. We make optimal use of the Netherlands' natural advantages: its favourable
location and a marine climate that is eminently suitable for greenhouse horticulture. We also
profit from a very extensive range of products, a robust sector chain and the fact that
horticulture here lays claim to only a limited amount of space in a tiny country with no space
to spare. To give you an idea of the strong spirit of innovation in the Netherlands: in 2001
alone we registered 600 new varieties; we have also created the Greenhouse of the Future,
which employs the most advanced mechanisation and computerisation" (Veerman, 2002). For
the horticulture sector a panel data set is available that allows for a detailed analysis of
technical efficiency. Tests of the third variant of the Porter hypothesis using a stochastic
frontier framework are currently missing in the literature.
The main finding of this paper is that increasing environmental stringency increases
technical efficiency in several subsectors of horticulture thereby lending support for the third
variant of the Porter hypothesis. A related but striking result is the considerable heterogeneity
in firm response to environmental stringency.
The organisation of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical
discussion of the incorporation of environmental policy in a stochastic production frontier
framework. Section 3 describes the data and the econometric model used. Section 4 discusses
the estimation results. Conclusions and directions for future research follow in Section 5.
42. Stochastic production frontier analysis and environmental policy
The use of stochastic frontier models has become increasingly widespread in applied
economic analyses.iii The motivation for using stochastic frontier models lies in evidence as
well as in theory. Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) claim that a lot of empirical evidence
"suggests that not all producers are always so successful in solving their optimisation
problems" and "not all producers are technically efficient" (o.c. p.2). Early theoretical
contributions are from Hicks (1935) and Williamson (1964). Hicks argues that "The best of
all monopoly profits is a quiet life" (o.c. p. 8). Williamson puts forward that managers rather
maximise their own utility, including emoluments and profits, than profits per se.
The notion of frontier has different meanings. It may refer to technical efficiency
(being at the boundary of the production set) or to allocative efficiency (cost minimisation or
profit maximisation). Earlier work in the empirical literature focuses on the estimation of
measures of technical efficiency, and on both technical and allocative efficiency (see Battese,
1992; Coelli et al., 1998; Bauer, 1990). For our purpose we are interested in more recent
models that allow for incorporation of exogenous variables that might affect efficiency
(Kumbhakar et al., 1991; Reifschneider and Stevenson 1991; Huang and Liu 1994; Battese
and Coelli 1995; and Hadri et al. (2003)). These exogenous variables are factors not under
control of the producer that nevertheless do have an effect on the performance of the firm. In
the case at hand environmental policy is such a variable. Testing the Porter hypothesis within
this context requires thus two steps. The first is the specification of a stochastic frontier
production function to estimate the technical efficiency of producers. The second component
is the specification and incorporation of policy variables and possibly other exogenous
variables which are not at the discretion of the producer, yet affect the technical performance
of firms.
The model employed in the present study is based on Coelli and Battese (1995), and
Hadri et al. (2003). It can be described as follows. Consider N  firms indexed by
Ni ,...,2,1=  that are observed over T  periods, with periods indexed by .,...,2,1 Tt =  Each
firm produces a single output using K  inputs. In our model the inputs are capital, labor,
energy, pesticides, nutrients (see the next section for a detailed presentation  of the data set). It
is quite common to assume a Cobb-Douglas technologyiv, with output ity  and inputs itX  (a
K -vector) in natural logarithms. The model to be estimated is
(1) itititit vwXy −+= β , TtNi ,...,2,1;,...,2,1 == .
Here β  is the unknown K -vector of production elasticities, assumed common to all
producers. The variables itw  and itv  are error terms with the following properties. The terms
itw  are iid  and are independent of the terms itv . The svit '  play a crucial role in the sense
that they incorporate producer-specific and time-specific variation from the frontier. It is
assumed that the svit '  are independently distributed and can be modelled as
(2) ititit Zv εγ +=
where itZ  is an M -vector of firm specific time-varying variables not controlled by the
producer, γ  is an unknown M -vector to be estimated and itε  is an error term following a
truncated normal distribution with mean value 0  and variance 2εσ  where the truncation point
varies with γitZ  such that .0≥itv
The technical efficiency of producer ),...,2,1( Nii =  can then be defined as
5(3) }exp{ itit vTE −=
Therefore, the smaller itv  the closer the producer is to its production frontier.
Under the assumptions made the statistical properties of the model are well
documented (see e.g., Hadri et al. 2003). For example, the conditional expectation of itv
given itε  is
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In the sequel we employ the framework outlined above and apply it to Dutch horticultural
firms. Among the explanatory Z variables of the technical efficiency model are indicators of
environmental stringency, and managerial or organisational characteristics of production (see
Battese and Coelli, 1995; Wilson et al., 2001; Trip et al., 2002). Suppose that the coefficient
corresponding to environmental stringency (say 1γ ) is negative and statistically significant.
Then increased stringency decreases the expected value of itv  and therefore brings the firm
closer to its production frontier. This provides support for the hypothesis that stringency of
environmental policy is reducing X-inefficiency. Of course, there are many caveats. One is
that environmental policy is usually generic and not aimed at individual firms, so that we
cannot obtain firm-specific impacts. Moreover, the notion of stringency is very difficult to
capture in general, and for this specific industry as well, as will be explained in the next
section.
3. Data
The data on horticulture firms cover the period 1991-1999. They are from two sources a
stratified sample of Dutch greenhouse firms included in the so called Farm Accountancy Data
Network (FADN) and from a survey on environmental program participation. The FADN is a
rotating panel giving an unbalanced panel data set (see for a discussion of the sampling
technique Poppe, 2004). The data include information on financial performance, production
techniques, crop types, physical and monetary output measures, and energy use for 417 firms
and 1727 observations. Table 1 and Table 2 provide information on the number of firms per
year, and the number of observations per firm, respectively. Crop types have been aggregated
into three crop systems: flowers, plants and vegetables.
6Table 1: Number of observations per year by crop system
Year Number of firms
Total Flowers Plants Vegetables
1991 189 72 45 72
1992 187 72 45 70
1993 184 70 45 69
1994 179 68 45 66
1995 200 71 57 72
1996 199 72 56 71
1997 206 75 58 73
1998 193 72 53 68
1999 190 71 52 67
Table 2: Number of observations per firm by crop system
Number of
Observations per firm
Number of firms
Total Flowers Plants Vegetables
1 20 7 5 8
2 30 9 7 14
3 107 44 27 36
4 92 34 25 33
5 87 31 26 30
6 65 25 18 22
7 5 0 0 5
8 1 0 0 1
9 10 5 2 3
The variables, their measurements units and means and standard deviations are given in Table
3. The inputs are land, labour, energy, capital, pesticides and nutrients, all measured in natural
logarithms. Land is expressed in hectare, labour in full time equivalents (fte). Energy use
consisting of gas, oil, electricity, and heat deliveries is expressed in gas equivalents. The
energy data are corrected for average temperature per year. Capital input is measured by its
replacement value. Pesticides and nutrients are expressed in monetary terms. This also holds
for output. All costs and revenues are deflated to 1995 values. We include Hicks-neutral
technical change in the production frontier indicating autonomous changes in the level of
technical inefficiency.
There are firms that change crop type over time as well as firms that produce more
than one crop. This heterogeneity poses a problem in the econometric analysis where we
prefer to have homogeneous firms with respect to their main activity. We deal with these
problems as follows. First, we delete firms that changed their main crop type over timev.
Secondly, for each year and each firm we determine the main crop type by calculating the
maximum revenue share of each crop in total production value. After identifying the main
crop type we determine the main crop system: vegetables, flowers and plants. At first
instance, these are used as dummies in a pooled model in the empirical analysis to account for
sectoral differences. The motivation for the aggregation is to reduce the number of parameters
to be estimated creating groups preferably with small within-group variation and large
between-group variation in production techniques. We shall test whether or not the data
support pooling. If not, we proceed on the basis of models on crop system. Preferably, one
would like to disaggregate the crop systems and test for structural differences across
individual crop types also. The limited number of observations for each specific crop prevents
this. Note, however, that production techniques differ particularly between crop systems and
much less within crop systems, so that within-crop system heterogeneity does not seem to
create difficulties.
7For the interpretation of the results of the econometric analysis it is also of interest to
know to what extent firms jointly produce vegetables, flowers and plants. The data indicate
that of those firms specialised in vegetables 5 % produce flowers and 1 % plants also; of those
specialised in flowers 5 % produce vegetables and 12 % plants too; and of those specialised in
plants, 1 % produced vegetables and 6 % flowers as well. Therefore, compared with
specialised flower growers, firms specialised in vegetables or plants less often have joint
production systems. Furthermore, compared with joint plant and flower production systems,
joint vegetables and flowers or joint vegetables and plants production systems are less
frequent. In summary, joint production across crop systems is rather uncommon mainly the
result of the rather distinct production systems needed for the different crop systems.
8Table 3 Summary statistics
Variable Description Total Flowers Plants Vegetables
Mean St.err. Mean St.err. Mean St.err. Mean St.err.
LQTOT Log of output (in Dfl. x1000) 6.76 0.82 6.71 0.85 6.93 0.86 6.70 0.75
LLAND Log of land (in hectare) 0.12 0.67 0.09 0.66 -0.08 0.76 0.28 0.54
LLABOR Log of labor (in fte) 1.78 0.66 1.75 0.68 1.77 0.69 1.81 0.61
LENERGY Log of physical energy (in natural gas
equivalents x1000)
6.14 0.96 6.04 0.97 5.99 0.85 6.35 0.98
LCAPITAL Log of replacement value of capital ( in Dfl
x1000)
7.56 0.71 7.61 0.69 7.50 0.90 7.55 0.55
LPESTICIDE Log of pesticides (in Dfl. x1000) 2.31 1.03 2.54 1.10 1.84 1.04 2.41 0.80
LNUTRIENT Log of nutrients (in Dfl. x1000) 2.24 1.13 1.95 1.03 1.73 1.06 2.91 0.94
TREND Trend (1991=1 … 1999=9) 5.05 2.57 5.02 2.59 5.20 2.53 4.98 2.58
AGE Age of the managing director (in years) 45.8 9.96 45.7 9.39 45.9 10.0 45.75 10.5
AMANAGER Number of managers (including managing
director)
1.49 0.74 1.51 0.76 1.51 0.77 1.46 0.69
FAMFIRM Dummy (1 for family-owned firm; 0 otherwise) 0.87 0.86 0.78 0.94
EIA PROGRAM Dummy (1 for EIA participation; 0 otherwise) 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.07
9We now turn to environmental policy. Dutch horticulture is subject to a number of
environmental policy measures imposed by the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food
Quality and the Ministry of Spatial Planning, Housing and the Environment. Environmental
policy measures for Dutch horticulture relate mainly to the reduction of 2CO -emissions.
Horticulture accounts for about 80% of total energy use associated with the agricultural sector
and 5% of national energy use (Netherlands Court of Audit 2002). To reduce energy intensity
a covenant was negotiated between the horticulture sector and the government in 1993,
entailing a 50% reduction in 2000 relative to 1980. A dummy PROG1 is included to indicate
the 1993 agreementvi. More recently, in 1997 another voluntary agreement (GLAMI) was
reached on energy, pesticides, and nutrient reduction for the period 2000-2010. The
agreement entails detailed reduction norms per crop type. It became compulsory in 2002
(GLAMI, 2000). Table 4 gives the goals for 2010 per input. Although compulsory outside the
observation period, firms anticipated as from 1997, which is well before the end of the time
span we observe. A dummy PROG2 is included to indicate the 1997 agreementvii.
Table 4. 1997 GLAMI agreement
Input Goal for 2010
Energy 65% reduction relative to 1980
Pesticides Vegetables: 72% reduction relative to the average use during 1984-1988
Flowers: 88% reduction relative to the average use during 1984-1988
Plants: 88% reduction relative to the average use during 1984-1988
Nutrients 95% reduction relative to 1980
Source: GLAMI (2000).
The Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality has a number of instruments
associated with these voluntary agreements that may affect the production efficiency of
horticulture firms like taxes, subsidies, and information services. MIA and VAMIL (since
1993) are environmental investment subsidies relating to a broad set of capital goods to
reduce the use of, amongst others inputs, energy, pesticides and nutrients (VROM, several
years). EIA (since 1997) allows firms to deduct 15-55% of total investment or depreciate
specific environmental investments at will (Senter, 2003). In addition, specific subsidies on
co-generating heating systems are in place since late 1997. Also, Dutch horticulture benefits
from implicit subsidies through low-VAT tariffs on energy, pesticides and nutrients. In 1996,
an energy tax (REB) was introduced. The effect on energy prices was negligible, because like
other large energy-intensive industries with a MJA, Dutch horticulture was exempted from
the energy tax. Thus, there will be no effect on production efficiency (ECN, 2002). Some of
these measures are candidates to be taken into account in the analysis, particularly because of
another data set on EIA Program participation. However, this data set is far from ideal
because of incomplete information on a subset of our 1991-1999 sample. The reason for this
is that firms are asked about EIA Program participation on a retrospective basis in 2002. As
part of the firms rotate in and out of the sample we lack information on those firms who
moved out of the sample between 1997-2002viii.
4. Estimation results
The stochastic frontier panel data model is specified as follows
(4) 
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with itw  and itv  specified as in section 2. The technical efficiency model reads:
(5) itittitit TRENDEIAPROGFIRMvE ++++= 3210][ γγγγ
with firm-specific, time-varying variables AGE (of the farmer), AMANAGER, and
FAMFIRM included in the vector FIRM to capture firm-specific variation in managerial and
organisational structure. The meaning of these variables is given in Table 3. We also include
PROG time-varying dummies indicating environmental policy regimes, and EIA an
exogenous firm-specific, time-varying EIA Program participation variable.
The estimates of ),,,(: vw σσγβϑ =  are obtained by means of maximum likelihood.
On the basis of these estimates one can obtain estimates and associated confidence intervals
of producer-specific time-variant technical efficiency. The estimates are obtained using the
4.1c Version of FRONTIER (Coelli, 1992).
The results are presented in table 5 where standard errors are given within brackets.
First, we test for the presence of technical inefficiency. At the bottom of Table 5 log-
likelihood values and Likelihood Ratio (LR) statistics for the presence of technical
inefficiencyix are presented, together with information on the number of observations. The LR
statistic in Table 5 gives the test statistics, with degrees of freedom in parenthesis, for the null
hypothesis of no technical inefficiencies in production. The LR test rejects the hypothesis of
no technical inefficiencies. Second, we tested the hypothesis that the frontier models are the
same for each crop system. That is, we tested whether structural differences in production
structure exist, by testing a pooled model versus separate models for flowers, plants and
vegetables. The likelihood ratio test rejects the hypothesis of a pooled model. The LR test
statistic equals 934 and is larger than the critical value for the Chi-square distribution at size
0.05 and 17 degrees of freedom of 27.85.  Note, that the coefficient of LNUTRIENTS in the
pooled model in column one of Table 5 has the wrong sign, as one would expect a positive
effect of inputs on output. Controlling for heterogeneity in production structure between crop
systemsx reveals the expected sign (see Table 5). In the remainder of this section we therefore
discuss the results of the theoretically preferred modelsxi.
The production frontier model results indicate that production is increasing in both
fixed and variable inputs. The output elasticity of variable inputs is lower compared with the
fixed inputs. The output elasticity of Energy, LENERGY, is higher than that of other variable
inputs, LPESTICIDE and LNUTRIENT. The sum of these estimates indicates increasing
returns to scale for each and every crop system. Note also the significant TREND in output of
about 3 to 4 percent yearlyxii. The estimates furthermore suggest significant structural
differences in production structure between crop systems; the output elasticity of LCAPITAL
varies considerably, ranging from 2% for plants and 50% for flowers, respectively. A closer
inspection of the production systems suggest that this might be related to heterogeneity within
crop systems not accounted forxiii.
 The technical efficiency model indicates significant differences between firms and
across time. Table 6 shows mean technical efficiency scores by sector and year. Mean
technical efficiency varies from 0.77 for plants (in 1995 and 1996), to 0.94 for vegetables in
1991.
Also, parameter estimates of the technical efficiency model (as shown in Table 5)
indicate structural differences between crop systems. Particularly interesting for our purposes
is the effect of EIA PROGRAM on technical efficiency across crop system. In general EIA
PROGRAM reduces technical inefficiency although not always statistically significant.
Summarising, our findings are mixed but do not seem to reject the hypothesis that firm
performance increased due to environmental agreements aiming at  stronger environmental
stringency. These findings do no change when considering more flexible specifications as the
Translog (see Appendix A Table A1).
Furthermore, the estimates indicate firm-specific heterogeneity in technical
efficiency. Family operated farms for example perform  less efficiently relative to not-family
11
operated farms (Inc.). Furthermore, the estimates suggest that firms’ time horizon as
summarised in AGE are important as well in explaining technical efficiencyxiv. Summarising,
part of the heterogeneity between firms can be explained by managerial and organisational
factors.
Table 5 Estimates of Cobb-Douglas Stochastic Frontier Panel Data Models
Variable
Pooled Flowers Plants Vegetables
Production
frontier
CONSTANT 1.74** (0.19) 2.11** (0.38) 4.46** (0.35) 3.60** (0.32)
LLAND 0.09** (0.03) 0.13** (0.05) 0.27** (0.05) 0.29** (0.04)
LLABOR 0.44** (0.02) 0.29** (0.04) 0.40** (0.03) 0.24** (0.03)
LENERGY 0.33** (0.02) 0.09** (0.04) 0.31** (0.04) 0.30** (0.02)
LCAPITAL 0.24** (0.02) 0.48** (0.05) 0.02 (0.03) 0.11** (0.04)
LPESTICIDES 0.01 (0.01) 0.04** (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.03* (0.02)
LNUTRIENTS -0.07** (0.01) 0.04 (0.03) 0.05** (0.02) 0.07** (0.02)
TREND 0.04** (0.00) 0.04** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01)
Technical
efficiency
CONSTANT -6.20** (0.54) -9.90** (0.80) -8.44** (3.15) -10.0** (0.35)
AGE 0.07** (0.01) 0.15** (0.01) -0.01** (0.01) 0.02** (0.00)
FAMFIRM 1.64** (0.12) 1.10** (0.15) 3.96** (1.54) 0.28** (0.13)
AMANAGER -0.54** (0.07) -0.40** (0.10) 0.70 (0.25) -0.24** (0.09)
TREND -0.09* (0.02) -0.19* (0.07) -0.02 (0.04) 0.01 (0.01)
EIA PROGRAM -0.79** (0.11)   -0.10 (0.41) -0.45 (0.30) -0.73** (0.31)
S2 = Sv2 + Su2 0.66** (0.08) 0.77** (0.07) 1.72** (0.61) 0.05** (0.01)
Su2/ S2 0.88** (0.02) 0.92** (0.01) 0.97** (0.01) 0.51** (0.11)
Log-likelihood
Number of
observations
Number of cross-
sections
Number of time
periods
LR statistic
-475
1511
401
9
204(7)
-134
554
148
9
180 (7)
-102
404
105
9
63 (7)
+171xv
553
148
9
52 (7)
Notes: *, ** significant at 5% and 1%, respectively.
Table 6. Mean Technical Efficiency Scores for Dutch Horticulture by Sector and Year
Flowers Plants Vegetables
Overall Mean .83 (.11) .80 (.12) .90 (.06)
Mean                 1991 .80 (.17) .82 (.09) .94 (.03)
1992 .83 (.09) .81 (.11) .90 (.05)
1993 .82 (.10) .81 (.12) .88 (.06)
1994 .82 (.10) .81 (.11) .90 (.06)
1995 .82 (.12) .77 (.16) .89 (.07)
1996 .84 (.09) .77 (.14) .89 (.06)
1997 .87 (.06) .82 (.09) .93 (.06)
1998 .86 (.07) .82 (.11) .91 (.09)
1999 .85 (.09) .82 (.10) .91 (.08)
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5. Conclusions
This paper proposed a test of the Porter hypothesis for the Dutch horticulture sector, using a
stochastic production frontier analysis. We started our analysis with a theoretical exposition,
where the usual model is extended by exogenous policy variables to account for the effect of
environmental policy of firm performance. After having described the data we discussed our
empirical model and presented our results.
Our main conclusion is that there is considerable heterogeneity in the way firms react
to policy measures designed to increase environmental stringency. The estimation results
indicate, for example, that the 1997 voluntary agreement increase technical efficiency of
vegetable and plants growers contrary to specialised flower growers. Specialised flower
growers’ technical efficiency increased, however, after the 1993 multi-year agreement on
energy reduction, contrary to vegetable and plant growers. It should be stressed that these
results depend on the specific environmental stringency measure used. Future research will
consider more specific and if possible individual-specific environmental stringency measures.
One of such individual measure we currently investigate is whether we can include firms’
participation in the EIA program, Demo/experimental programs and Information programs.
Acknowledgement
We thank Ada Wossink and participants of the 2004 EAERE Conference in Budapest for
suggestions and comments.
References
Battese, G. (1992): “Frontier production functions and technical efficiency: a survey of
empirical applications in agricultural economics”, Agricultural Economics 7, pp. 185-209
Battese, G. and Coelli, T. (1995): “A model for technical inefficiency effects in a stochastic
frontier production function”, Empirical Economics 20, pp.325-332
Bauer, P. (1990): “Recent developments in the econometric estimation of frontiers”, Journal
of Econometrics 46, pp.39-56
Coelli, T., Rao, D. and Battese, G. (1998), An introduction to efficiency and productivity
analysis, Kluwer Academic Publishers. Dordrecht
Coelli, T. (1992): “A computer program for frontier production function estimation”,
Economics Letters 39: 29-32
ECN, several years, Energy Report (In Dutch), ECN Beleidsstudies, Petten
ECN (2002),  Effect of environmental policy on CO2 emissions,. VROM. The Hague
Fried, H., Lovell, C. and Schmidt, S. (1993), The Measurement of Productive Efficiency,
Oxford University Press. Oxford
Gabel, L.H. and Sinclair-Desgagné, R. (2001): “The Firm, Its Procedures and Win-Win
Environmental Regulations”, in  Folmer, H,  Landis G., Gerking, S. and Rose, A. (eds.),
Frontiers of environmental economics, Edgar Elgar; Aldershot, pp. 148-75
Gabel, L.H. and Sinclair-Desgagné, R. (1995): “Corporate responses to environmental
concerns”, in Folmer, H., Landis-Gabel, H. and Opschoor, H. (eds.), Principles of
Environmental and Resource Economics, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, pp. 347-61
GLAMI (2000), GLAMI, Handbook environmental regulations in Dutch horticulture (in
Dutch), Stuurgroep Glastuinbouw en Milieu. Utrecht
Goncharova, N, A. Oude Lansink, A.J. van der Vlist and J. Verstegen. (2004): “Analysing
Investment Spikes in Dutch Horticulture”, Working Paper. Wageningen University.
Hadri, K., Guernat, C. and Whittaker, J. (2003): “Estimation of technical inefficiency effects
using panel data and doubly heteroscedastic production frontiers”, Empirical economics 28,
pp. 203-222
Hicks, J. (1935): “The theory of monopoly: A survey”, Econometrica 3, pp. 1-20
Huang, C. and Liu, J. (1994): “Estimation of a non-neutral stochastic frontier production
function”, Journal of Productivity Analysis 5, pp. 171-180
13
Jaffe, A., Peterson, S., Portney P. and Stavins, R (1995): “Environmental regulation and the
competitiveness of US manufacturing: What does the evidence tell us?”, Journal of Economic
Literature 33, pp. 132-163
Jaffe, A. and Palmer, K. (1997) “Environmental Regulation and Innovation: A Panel Data
Survey” Review of Economics and Statistics 79, pp 610-619.
Kumbhakar, S. and Lovell, C. (2000), Stochastic Frontier Analysis, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge
Knittel, C. (2002): “Alternative regulatory methods and firm efficiency: Stochastic frontier
evidence from the US electricity industry”, The Review of Economics and Statistics 84, pp.
530-540
Lanjouw, J. and Mody, A. (1996): “Innovation and the international diffusion of
environmentally responsive technology”, Research Policy 25, pp. 549-571
Mohr, R. (2002): “Technical change, external economies, and the Porter hypothesis”, Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management 43, pp. 158-168
Mulatu, A. (2004), Relative stringency of environmental regulation and international
competitiveness, PhD. Thesis. Research Series 332, Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam
Nakanoi, M., 2003, “Can environmental regulation improve technology and efficiency? An
empirical analysis using the Malmqvist productivity index”, Working paper, Kobe University
Graduate School of Economics. Paper presented at the 2003 EAERE conference Bilbao
Netherlands Court of Audit (2002), Effects of energy saving policies in Dutch horticulture (in
Dutch), Sdu Publishers, Den Haag
Palmer, K., Oates, W. and Portney, P. (1995): “Tightening environmental standards: The
benefit-cost or the no-cost paradigm?”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, pp. 119-132
Poppe, K. (ed.) (2004): Dutch FADN data (in Dutch) Agricultural Research Institute. The
Hague.
Porter, M. (1991): “America’s green strategy”, Scientific American, p. 168
Porter, M. and Van der Linde, C. (1995a): “Towards a new conception of the environment-
competitiveness relationship”, Journal of economic Perspectives 9, pp. 97-118
Porter, M. and Van der Linde, C. (1995b): “Green and Competitive: Breaking the stalemate",
Harvard Business Review 73, pp. 120-137
Rijfschneider, D. and Stevenson , R. (1991): “Systematic departures from the frontier: A
framework for the analysis of firm inefficiency”, International Economic Review 32, pp. 715-
723
Roediger, T. (2002): “The stringency of environmental regulation and the Porter hypothesis”,
in Marsiliani, L., Rauscher, M. and Withagen, C. (eds.), Environmental Economics and the
International Economy, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, pp. 123-147
Senter, 2003, EIA. Annual Report (In Dutch). Senter. Zwolle.
Taylor, M., Rubin, E. and Hounshell, D. (2003): “Effect of government actions on
technological innovation for 2SO  control”, Environmental Science and Technology
Trip, G., Thijssen, G., Renkema J., and Huirne, R. (2002): “Measuring Managerial
Efficiency: The Case of Commercial Greenhouse Growers,” Agricultural Economics 27,
pp.175-181
Van Beers, C., van den Bergh, J. de Moor S. and Oosterhuis, F (2002): Milieueffecten van
indirecte subsidies,. VROM. The Hague
Veerman, C. (2002): Speech at the opening of the annual conference of the Association
Internationale des Producteurs de l'Horticulture (AIPH) in Noordwijk
Vries, F. de and Withagen, C. (2004): “Patents and environmental stringency: Testing the
Porter hypothesis”, mimeo Tilburg University, Tilburg
VROM (several years): MIA rules (in Dutch). Staatscourant. Sdu Publishers, The Hague
Williamson, O. (1964), The economics of discretionary behavior: Managerial objectives in a
theory of the firm, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs
Wilson, P., Hadley, D., and Asby, C. (2001): “The influence of management characteristics
on the technical efficiency of wheat farmers in eastern England”, Agricultural Economics 24,
pp 329-338.
14
Appendix A  Translog specification
Suppose we assume a Translog technology with output ity  and inputs itX  (a K+K2-vector) in
natural logarithms. The Translog is consistent with a well-behaved production function with
positive marginal product, diminishing marginal product, and positive output elasticity of
inputs. The model to be estimated is
(A1)  itititit vwXfy −+= );( β , TtNi ,...,2,1;,...,2,1 == .
The variables itw  and itv  are error terms with the following properties. The terms itw  are iid
and are independent of the terms itv . The svit '  play a crucial role in the sense that they
incorporate producer-specific and time-specific variation from the frontier. It is assumed that
the svit '  are independently distributed and can be modelled as
(A2) ititit Zv εγ +=
where itZ  is an M -vector of firm specific time-varying variables not controlled by the
producer, γ  is an unknown M -vector to be estimated and itε  is an error term following a
truncated normal distribution with mean value 0  and variance 2εσ  where the truncation point
varies with γitZ  such that .0≥itv
The parameter estimates of the Translog specification is given in Table A1. Associated input
elasticities are calculated from partial differentiation of the production frontier. The elasticity
is given by
(A3) TRENDX
x
yE j
k
kjkj
j
j βββ ++=∂
∂
= ∑ ,
that varies across firms and over time, and often evaluated at the mean. The estimate of
returns to scale is calculated as the sum of the input elasticities
(A4) ∑=
j
jERTS .
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Table A1. Estimates of Translog Stochastic Frontier Panel Data Models
Variable Pooled Flowers Plants Vegetables
Production frontier
CONSTANT 12.38** (1.07) 23.94** (1.14) 13.03** (4.62) 17.82** (1.17)
LLAND 3.74** (0.49) 2.09* (0.92) 6.79** (1.29) 0.59 (0.99)
LLABOR 1.44** (0.45) -0.37 (0.95) 1.42* (0.88) 5.20** (0.96)
LENERGY -0.47** (0.23) -0.85 (0.55) -0.44 (0.75) -1.43** (0.44)
LCAPITAL -2.78** (0.23) -3.97** (0.41) -2.46** (0.75) -3.23** (0.41)
LPESTICIDES 0.67** (0.26) 1.49** (0.44) -0.44 (0.49) 0.01 (0.81)
LNUTRIENTS -0.47** (0.18) 1.67** (0.36) -1.17** (0.39) 0.40 (0.47)
TREND -0.09* (0.06) 0.14 (0.13) -0.24** (0.10) -0.17 (0.10)
LLABOR2 0.18** (0.04) 0.14 (0.08) 0.21** (0.05) 0.15** (0.06)
LCAPITAL2 0.24** (0.02) 0.20** (0.05) 0.20** (0.04) 0.15** (0.04)
LLAND2 0.32** (0.05) 0.09 (0.11) 0.62** (0.13) -0.18* (0.11)
LENERGY2 0.09** (0.02) 0.02* (0.04) 0.08 (0.05) -0.05* (0.03)
LPESTICIDES2 0.04** (0.01) 0.15** (0.02) 0.02* (0.02) 0.04* (0.02)
LNUTRIENTS2 -0.02** (0.01) 0.04* (0.02) 0.01 (0.09) -0.07* (0.02)
LLABORxLCAPITAL -0.04 (0.06) 0.15 (0.12) 0.01* (0.02) -0.45** (0.11)
LLABORxLLAND -0.03 (0.08) -0.50** (0.13) 0.13 (0.09) 0.10 (0.11)
LLABORxLENERGY -0.20** (0.05) -0.18* (0.09) -0.30** (0.15) -0.19* (0.08)
LLABORxLPESTICIDES -0.11** (0.03) 0.02 (0.06) -0.11** (0.10) -0.04 (0.06)
LLABORxLNUTRIENTS -0.01 (0.03) 0.02 (0.07) -0.07* (0.05) 0.21** (0.07)
LLABORxTREND -0.00 (0.08) -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.04) 0.01 (0.01)
LCAPITALxLAND -0.40** (0.07) -0.13 (0.11) -0.90** (0.01) 0.22 (0.14)
LCAPITALxLENERGY 0.01 (0.04) 0.22** (0.08) 0.04 (0.15) 0.19** (0.07)
LCAPITALxLPESTICIDES -0.09** (0.04) -0.29** (0.07) 0.07 (0.08) -0.02 (0.12)
LCAPITALxLNUTRIENTS 0.03 (0.03) -0.22** (0.04) 0.20** (0.07) -0.18* (0.05)
LCAPITALxTREND 0.02** (0.01) -0.02 (0.02) 0.04** (0.05) 0.02 (0.01)
LLANDxLENERGY -0.12** (0.04) 0.20** (0.10) -0.13 (0.01) -0.16* (0.08)
LLANDxLPESTICIDES 0.07* (0.04) -0.05 (0.07) -0.00** (0.00) -0.09 (0.11)
LLANDxLNUTRIENTS 0.00 (0.04) 0.12 (0.08) -0.22** (0.07) 0.18* (0.09)
LLANDxTREND -0.02** (0.01) 0.02 (0.02) -0.05** (0.06) -0.02* (0.02)
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Technical efficiency model
CONSTANT -7.22** (0.72) -4.58** (0.81) 8.37** (0.40) -0.82** (0.37)
AGE -0.08** (0.01) 0.01** (0.01) -0.02** (0.02) 0.01** (0.01)
FAMFIRM 0.77* (0.01) 0.68** (0.17) -3.07** (0.05) 0.40* (0.22)
AMANAGER -0.41** (0.03) -0.34 (0.08) 0.93 (0.01) -0.16** (0.07)
TREND -0.14** (0.02) -0.01 (0.03) 0.03** (0.03) -0.01 (0.01)
EIA PROGRAM -0.86** (0.24)   -1.59** (0.41) -1.48** (0.04) -0.41 (0.25)
S2 = Sv2 + Su2 0.85** (0.10) 0.37** (0.05) 1.37** (0.06) 0.04** (0.01)
Su2/ S2 0.94** (0.01) 0.91** (0.02) 0.97** (0.02) 0.43** (0.12)
Log-likelihood
Number of observations
Number of cross-sections
Number of time periods
LR statistic
-268
1511
401
9
260 (7)
-52
554
148
9
220 (7)
-37
404
105
9
42 (7)
+209
553
148
9
42 (7)
Notes: *, ** significant at 5% and 1%, respectively
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i
 These authors also point out that the Porter hypothesis is not in line with the the neoclassical theory of
the firm and that it is controversial in the sense that it implies the paradox that firms should adopt
environmental policy voluntarily and unilaterally since it is in their self-interest to do so. See also
Palmer et al. (1995), and Jaffe et al. (1995).
ii
 Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné (1995) also observe that the advantage in both variants may become
disadvantages if the importing countries do not introduce similar regulations.
iii
 For an excellent review of the developments of the field we refer to the recent book by Kumbhakar and Knox
Lovell (2000), from which we heavily draw in the present section.
iv
 The translog specification is an alternative specification. It is considered in Appendix A.
v
 In total 77 firms did and they are removed from the sample, reducing the sample by 312 observations. The
sample used in the empirical application therefore contains 1727 observations for 417 firms, as mentioned earlier.
vi
 PROG1 is 0 before 1993, and 1 for 1993 and thereafter.
vii
 PROG2 is 0 before 1997, and 1 for 1997 and thereafter.
viii
 We removed 266 observations for the 109 firms for which the necessary information is lacking.
ix
 The likelihood ration test statistic equals )ln(ln2 10 LL −− where 0L  is the value of the log
likelihood of the restricted model and 1L  the log likelihood of the unrestricted model. The LR has an
asymptotic Chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions on the
parameters if the null hypothesis is true.
x
  The change in sign may relate to the heterogeneity in the technical production system.
xi
 A Likelihood Ratio test showed that PROG1 and PROG2 do not increase the log-likelihood
significantly. As a result we did not include these variables in the final specification.
xii
 Note that the parameter of TREND in the production frontier model does not give the full impact on
output because it appears in the technical efficiency model also.
xiii
 Some flower varieties can either be produced in ‘low temperature regimes’ using a capital- extensive
and energy-extensive production system, or in ‘higher temperature regimes’ using a capital-intensive
and energy-intensive production system.
xiv
 The importance of time horizon in explaining investments in Dutch horticulture can be found also in
Goncharova et al., 2004.
xv
 FRONTIER 4.1 models the log-likelihood in terms of probability heights rather than probabilities
possibly resulting in positive log-likelihood values.
